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ABSTRACT
Public sector involvement in real estate development is
not a new phenomena. Government participation in
development of cities dates back to colonial times and the
planning of Washington, D.C. and Philadelphia. In 1949
public development changed dramatically with the inception
of the urban renewal program. Poor communication between
public planners and developers, and a lack of market
analysis led to the overestimation of development potential
for sites. Consequently, land was cleared, residents and
businesses displaced leaving land vacant for years.
Cities now recognize the need for collaborative efforts
between public agencies and developers. With a reduction
in federal assistance cities have turned to public/private
partnerships to stimulate and induce private development
activity. In public/private partnerships public agencies
join with private developers for redevelopment projects in
which cities provide assistance with land assembly and
approvals, and financial inducements, while the developer
builds a project that will create jobs, tax dollars and
help revitalize a city. Through this type of relationship
many cities have been able to set and implement policy
objectives that would not ordinarily be achieved through
traditional private development.
This thesis will focus on the Pennsylvania Avenue
Development Corporation (PADC) and the redevelopment of
Pennsylvania Avenue. It will identify the elements of
public/private partnerships that have allowed the PADC to
set and attain policy objectives. It looks at the capital
structure and how the PADC utilizes multiple funding
sources to finance its projects. It also looks at the
lessons that the PADC has learned over 15 years and 25
projects, as well as the affect of the D.C. real estate
market on its success. It illustrates how the PADC used
these elements to achieve affirmative action goals, the
historic preservation of Washington, D.C. landmarks, and
the new development of a 1000 unit residential community.
Part Four applies the techniques used by the PADC to a
generic model for public/private partnerships.
Thesis Advisor: Lynne B. Sagalyn
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INTRODUCTION
Government investment in public development efforts is
not a new phenomena. It is only recently, however, that
joint development efforts between government and private
developers have won the support of both the public and
private sectors. Past failures in this area have lead many
to believe that it was not possible for cities to stimulate
redevelopment or to use private development interests to
provide public benefits. Over the course of the last
twenty years, to the surprise of most, the successful
completion of major redevelopment projects implemented
through the cooperative efforts of public development
agencies and private developers has presented a new record
of achievement.
This thesis will look at public/private partnerships,
in particular the evolution of public sector planning and
implementation of redevelopment projects. I will focus on
the Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation (PADC), a
public developer specially created by the U.S. Congress for
the sole purpose of redeveloping the one-mile portion of
Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House to the Capitol. I
will identify key planning elements which have been
instrumental to the PADC's overall success as a public
developer and demonstrate how the agency's powers and
resources have allowed it to set and implement policy
objectives that could not have been achieved through
traditional private development activities.
I have chosen to study the PADC because the agency has
been very successful in the redevelopment of a significant
national boulevard, as well as, in their ability to set and
attain policy objectives whose benefits extend beyond the
physical restoration of a distressed area. Also, the
redevelopment of Pennsylvania Avenue provides an excellent
example of how the local development climate can impact a
public development agency's ability to succeed. Finally,
the PADC operated with unique financial resources. While
most cities do not have access to the same type of
resources, important lessons can be drawn from how PADC
used them to further its policy objectives.
Part One of this thesis charts the history of public
development, focusing on the role of government in
redevelopment. It tracks the evolution of codevelopment
from the advent of urban renewal in the fifties to the
Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) program started in
the mid-seventies, and defines current day public/private
partnerships and the roles and responsibilities shared by
cities and developers. Finally, it sets the stage for Part
Two of the thesis by giving the history of the PADC.
Part Two identifies those aspects of the PADC's










implementation of their public/private
s. It starts by laying out the PADC's capital
and identifying several financial tools used by
to stimulate private development interest. It
some of the valuable lessons learned and
corrections made by the PADC over its 15-year
Specifically, it looks at how and why the PADC
its approach to development competitions and
negotiations. The methods and strategies used by
the PADC in land acquisition and disposition changed
significantly over this period, in part because of the
success of early PADC projects and in part, in response to
the growing strength of the local real estate market.
Part Three looks more closely at some of the policy
objectives that the PADC tried to achieve through the deals
it made with private developers -- how it priced and valued
these objectives. I analyze the agency's approach to
setting and achieving affirmative action quotas, historic
preservation goals, and, finally, new residential
development in an area that is currently void of housing.
I also examine how these objectives and the guidelines
behind them have changed over the course of the last 15
years. Three projects are the focus of this analysis: The
Willard Hotel, the first project completed through a
experience thatredevelopment
development competition; Market Square, the first PADC
project to incorporate a significant residential component;
and Lansburgh, the most recent development competition, one
which will restore a historic department store, and when
completed in 1991, will be entirely residential.
Part Four looks at public/private partnerships as we
move into the nineties. Drawing on the experiences of the
PADC, it discusses how the lessons learned can assist
cities looking to the private sector for new investment.
By studying the PADC's capital structure, cities can better
identify separate sources and corresponding uses for funds,
and, by doing so, leverage revenue-generating property,
whether it be owned by a public development agency (PDA) or
through tax increments generated by private investment.
PADC's effort to include minority investors in its projects
also provides insight into means cities can employ to carry
out a commitment to improve the quality of life for its
residents. This section of the thesis also comments on the
efforts made by the PADC to create housing in the
Pennsylvania Avenue area, and how the lack of an affordable
housing component has impacted its success to date. PADC
has been very successful, in planning as well as
implementing its projects. While other public development
agencies might not enjoy the same level of resources or the
fortuitous market conditions that contributed to the
successful implementation of PADC's plan, they can learn --
the effect of preparing a complete master plan, how careful
planning of resource allocation allows PDAs to assist
private developers, that policy objectives can be achieved
while stimulating private redevelopment, and that even
careful planning and access to financial resources does not
insure that all objectives can be achieved.
PART ONE
PUBLIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE PADC
The role of government in real estate development dates
back to colonial times, but it was not until the advent of
urban renewal that the public sector attempted to
significantly alter the market-driven pattern of private
development. The urban renewal program, which began with
Title I of the Housing Act of 1949, was designed to reverse
a pattern of urban deterioration and blight that had woven
its way into the fabric of American cities. Through the
infusion of huge sums of public funds for the assemblage of
private land and subsequent clearing for redevelopment, the
federal government hoped to revitalize cities. With the
power of eminent domain local redevelopment agencies
acquired, cleared and disposed of land within designated
urban renewal areas that were deemed blighted. The federal
government provided the necessary funding and absorbed any
land cost write-downs.1 City agencies did not involve
developers in the planning of projects slated for urban
renewal. By statute, the planning activities of local
agencies were directed towards the elimination of slum
areas, which may or may not have coincided with demands of
local real estate markets. In combination with poor
planning, this led many agencies to overestimate the
development potential of an area designated for
redevelopment. Furthermore, after they had sold these
cleared parcels to developers, city agencies then removed
themselves from the actual development process, which meant
that they had no way of insuring that developers would
follow through with new development. The consequences of
these actions included the permanent displacement of
long-time residents and businesses, as well as the massive
bulldozing of major tracts of land which lay vacant for
many years until a developer could be found. Inexperience,
poor planning, and lack of joint participation between
public development agencies and private developers are some
of the reasons that urban renewal has been widely
criticized by urban scholars.2
The phase out of urban renewal in the early seventies
left cities searching for alternative strategies and
funding sources. The need for redevelopment was still
present for aging cities trying to compete with the
continued expansion of suburban development. In place of
the federal urban renewal funding, cities turned to local
sources -- tax increment financing, tax abatement, the
leasing of air rights -- and one federally sponsored
program -- the Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG)
Program.3
Established in 1978, the UDAG program sought to unite
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public agencies and private developers for the purpose of
joint redevelopment. The program provided cities with
"gap" money to fund the increased costs of development
within cities. The program's guidelines required cities to
identify development opportunities and to secure
private-sector interest before funds would be made
available. The UDAG program contributed significantly to
the form of public/private partnerships that we have
today. Elimination of federal appropriations has shut down
this program, and effectively shifted responsibility for
stimulating redevelopment to the state and city level.
While not long-lived, the UDAG program taught cities the
fundamentals of public/private deal making.4
What is a Public/Private Partnership?
Perhaps one of the toughest challenges facing cities
today is the revitalization of their urban core. For many
cities the creation of public/private partnerships has been
fundamental to revitalization. Public/private partnerships
unite public agencies, and the resources available to them,
with private development interests, for the purpose of
stimulating development activities in areas that might not
otherwise attract private development. By joining private
interests, which are primarily concerned with the financial
feasibility of a project, with public development agencies
looking to stimulate economic activity, a win/win situation
is created. Only because of their willingness to share in
the risks of development have cities been able to attract
development and redevelopment in areas where market driven
development was unlikely, that is, areas with few amenities
or services. 5
Unlike traditional development, public/private
partnerships force developers to work hand-in-hand with
public development agencies, from the planning stages
through construction and, sometimes, during the operations
phase. Through this collaboration and sharing of risks and
rewards, significant mutual gains are achieved, for both
the city and the developers. For developers, the city
provides financial incentives to develop, as well as powers
to implement activities that are often beyond the political
or legal means of private developers -- land assembly,
tenant relocation, installation of public infrastructure
improvements, parks and open space, as well as master
planning of future development and redevelopment. In
exchange for these incentives, cities look to share in
project profits, and to implement policy objectives
designed to benefit the public at large. 6
The Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation
The Site: Pennsylvania Avenue
When Major Pierre L'Enfant was commissioned by
President Thomas Jefferson to plan the nation's capitol he
envisioned the boulevard between the President's house and
the Capitol as a place of great ceremony and much
activity. L'Enfant's concept of the city revolved around
the triangle created by the White House, the Capitol, and
the Washington Monument, including in this area their
connecting axes. (See Figure 1). Beginning with
Jefferson's inaugural parade, and continuing with the
development of shops, saloons, boarding houses, and
residences, Pennsylvania Avenue became the focal point of
commercial and social activity.
It was not until the construction of the Federal
Triangle in the 1930s (see Figure 2) that increased
development of government buildings divided the Avenue and
pushed the commercial core of the city to the area north
and west of the White House. The post-World War II
weakening of the Washington, D.C. real estate market which
lasted into the seventies, left Pennsylvania Avenue void of
activity, and consequently, any new development. By the
early sixties disinvestment along the Avenue and rapid
deterioration of the existing buildings had become a public
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televised on national television. Soon after his
inauguration, President Kennedy formed the Advisory Council
on Pennsylvania Avenue which was given the responsibility
to prepare a master plan for the redevelopment and
revitalization of the nation's most prominent boulevard.7
Creating a Public Developer
Preparation of the master plan continued through the
Johnson and Nixon administrations with both Presidents'
full support. The plan, completed by the White House in
1969 without the participation of Congress, city
government, or District residents, caused much debate.
Many local residents and businesses felt that, while
addressing the historic significance of the Avenue, the
plan focused too much on government plans and did not
address the needs of the residents and businesses located
in the area. It was in response to this resistance that
President Nixon initialized legislation to create a
government corporation to oversee the redevelopment of the
Avenue. The Act stipulated that the PADC was required to
consult with the District and community officials, and give
primary consideration to the needs and desires of local
businesses and residents. 8
On October 27, 1972 Congress passed Public Law
92-578,86 Statute 1266, establishing the PADC as a wholly
owned federal development corporation. In this legislation
Congress stated "national interest required that the area
adjacent to Pennsylvania Avenue between the Capitol and the
White House to be developed and used in a manner suitable
to its ceremonial, physical and historic relationship to
the government and the community." The law included
appropriation of funds to be used by PADC staff and
consultants for the preparation of a comprehensive plan for
the redevelopment of the Avenue.9
Preparation of the plan took nearly two years and
involved over 100 meetings with representatives from
District and federal government agencies, community groups,
and business associations. A preliminary development plan
was completed in March of 1974 and sent to both District
and federal concerns for a 90-day review period. The PADC
sponsored workshops for individuals and businesses to
address concerns generated by the plan. The collaboration
of government and public interests produced a final
Pennsylvania Avenue Plan in October of 1974 that reached
consensus on the overall strategy and plan for the
redevelopment of Pennsylvania Avenue.10
Defining PADC's Mission and Powers:
The area designated for redevelopment was located
between the White House (16th Street) and the Capitol (3rd
Street) and bounded by Pennsylvania Avenue on the south and
'F' Street on the north. The scope of the redevelopment
was immense -- a 21-block area covering 110 acres. The
plan subsequently subdivided the area into two sectors,
western and eastern, with the FBI building located between
9th and 10th Streets as the dividing line. (See Figure 3).
The "Pennsylvania Avenue Plan 1974" identified proposed
land uses and building scopes for each development parcel
within the plan area. It concentrated commercial, retail,
and hotel uses in the western sector, and targeted the
eastern sector for the creation of a residential community,
with retail and community arts as a compliment to the
residential nature of the area. The plan outlined the role
of the PADC in overseeing the redevelopment of the 21-block
area. As a public developer it would:
1) acquire and assemble land, and prepare and implement
a development program for the site; and
2) oversee and provide assistance, both administrative
and financial, for redevelopment activities
undertaken by private developers who own land in the
plan area. The plan also outlined a unique program
providing multiple sources of financial support, in
amounts that the PADC believed were sufficient to
complete its redevelopment effort.11
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A description of the PADC's powers to implement the Plan
was included in the enacting legislation. Under the terms
of this legislation, the PADC had the authority to:
1) sue and be sued in its own name;
2) acquire land through eminent domain proceedings;
3) construct and rehabilitate buildings;
4) manage property; and
5) establish restrictions and standards necessary to
ensure conformance with the master plan.
Like most not-for-profit corporations the PADC was
exempt from all taxation, at both the Federal and District
of Columbia level. The PADC is, however, required to make
payments in lieu of taxes on all property that it owns. 12
Setting Goals and Obiectives
The goals and objectives of the plan were varied and far
reaching in their aims. Many objectives were directed
towards the physical restoration of the Avenue; others
sought to enhance the District's economic base; while still
others were directed towards improving the social
environment along the Avenue. The plan outlined the goals
of the PADC as follows:
1) restore Pennsylvania Avenue to its symbolic position
as the "main street of the nation";
2) breakdown the division between the Federal core
and the original downtown of the city;
3) create an attractive area to be enjoyed by residents
and visitors alike;
4) provide a mixture of commercial and cultural
activities that will stimulate street life;
5) establish a residential area with around-the-clock
activities that will support a wide variety of
commercial uses;
6) stimulate development on under-utilized land within
the plan area;
7) pursue an active historic preservation program, and
to retain buildings that are characteristic of the
Avenue's history;
8) bring new economic life through the creation of
jobs, retail development, and development
opportunities;
9) assist existing businesses through a relocation
assistance program while encouraging existing
businesses to remain in the area;
10) create opportunities for minorities during and after
the redevelopment effort, at levels befitting the
city with the highest percentage of minority
residents of any city in the country;
11) enhance the city's tax base through the intensive
development of land in a prime location; and
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12) implement the plan in a timely fashion consistent
with overall market demand in the Washington, D.C.
area.13
It was with these objectives in mind that the PADC
prepared its development program. When completed in late
1974, The Pennsylvania Avenue Plan outlined the anticipated
development of over 6.0 million square feet of new
structures. Using its own staff and consultants for market
analysis, the PADC projected the development potential as
encompassing 1200-1500 residential units, 3.2 million
square feet of office space, 900,000-950,000 square feet of
retail development, and 400-700 new hotel rooms. The
master plan also detailed and overall schedule calling for
the entire development to be complete by 1994. The
financial program prepared by the PADC staff was all
inclusive and estimated costs for all aspects of the plan,
including public improvements and infrastructure, land
acquisition and associated expenses, historic preservation,
tenant relocation, affirmative-action activities, and PADC
overhead and administrative expenses. In all, PADC
budgeted over $220 million (1974 dollars) worth of public
investment.14
PADC's Successful Voyage
Over the last 15 years much of the PADC's plan has been
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implemented with great success. Beginning with the
acquisition of the Willard Hotel in 1977, and culminating
with the completion of construction on the Market Square
North project scheduled for 1993, the PADC will have
attained, to a considerable degree, all of its goals. When
completed the PADC will have overseen the redevelopment and
new development of over 25 projects, including seven which
were developed via PADC sponsored competitions, and another
eight in which the PADC provided historic preservation
assistance. Figure 4 lists these projects and their
completion dates, as well as their size and the amount of
private investment involved with each. To date, these
projects have stimulated over $1.5 billion worth of private
investment, providing over 900 housing units and over 5.5
million square feet of office and retail development. In
addition, the PADC has undertaken public works projects
that included the development of eight parks, plazas and
fountains for use by the people who live, work and visit
Pennsylvania Avenue.15  The PADC has revitalized an area
void of development activity for nearly 40 years, while
preserving the grandeur of Pennsylvania Avenue and
implementing public policies for the good of the city.
FIGDRE 4
PADC DEVELOPMENT SUMMARY: 1977-1993
Name of Project Completion Office & Housing Private
Date Retail or Hotel Investment
(Sq. Ft.) (Units) (millions)
Canadian Emrbassy 1988 108,000 0 $40.0
601 Penn. Ave. 1986 225,800 0 45.0
Sears House 1984 33,400 0 8.0
Penn. Plaza 1990 175,100 150 84.0
Argentine Naval Bldg. 1982 21,900 0 1.4
Bob Hope USO Bldg. 1985 48,000 0 5.5
625 Indiana Ave. 1989 159,500 0 44.0
Liberty Place 1991 147,700 0 55.0
Gallery Row 1987 38,200 0 7.0
Jenifer Building 1988 43,400 0 8.6
717 D Street 1984 38,200 0 3.6
The Landsburgh 1991 64,000 385 75.0
Market Square 1990 688,600 210 230.0
Market Square North 1994 322,900 201 115.0
Stables Art Center 1987 33,700 0 2.1
1001 Penn. Ave. 1986 798,700 0 160.0
Evening Star Bldg. 1990 212,400 0 85.0
Presidential Bldg. 1992 274,300 0 8.8
1201 Penn. Ave. 1981 422,200 0 52.0
Pennsylvania Bldg. 1987 216,900 0 25.0
1301 Penn. Ave. 1981 206,000 0 21.0
National Place 1984 492,000 774* 180.0
National Press Bldg. 1985 408,000 0 95.0
Willard Hotel 1986 242,900 365* 121.0
Hotel Washington 1989 8,300 344* 12.5
TOTAL 5,525,700 946 $1,485
(*) = # of Hotel Roams 1,483*
Source: 1989 PADC Annual Report
PART TWO
ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS
The history of public development has taught us that
public involvement does not guarantee success. The
problematic legacy of urban renewal would have made many
skeptical of a public redevelopment effort of the magnitude
undertaken by the PADC. Those backing the creation of the
PADC, however, recognized the shortcomings of urban renewal
-- the lack of continuous public involvement and testing of
market feasibility that should have preceded the
bulldozer. Unlike urban renewal, the PADC has succeeded in
linking public improvement initiatives with private
development interests, through careful planning of the
entire 110-acre plan area and the early commitment of
substantial resources. This success can also be attributed
to the PADC's role as a public development partner, which
ensured public follow through till project completion.
Throughout its fifteen-year existence, the PADC has
maintained a presence along the Avenue with continuing
public improvement projects, and, as a redevelopment agency
overseeing private development activities, it could advise
and monitor the progress of non-PADC projects. It was this
kind of commitment and follow through that urban renewal
lacked.
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This chapter identifies those elements of
public/private development ventures -- the capital
structure, lessons learned through early projects, and land
acquisition strategy -- that have been critical to the
success of the PADC. It introduces and details the capital
structure of the PADC, including its multiple sources of
funding, and how this structure provides the PADC with the
financial tools necessary to implement the Plan. It looks
at how the PADC used these resources to attract developers
to an area long neglected by new investment. It also
details the PADC's evolution, and how it changed its
approach to issues such as developer negotiations, project
scheduling, and preparation of the development prospectus.
Of particular note is the means by which the PADC acquired
and disposed of property, and how their strategy differed
from that followed by private developers. The contribution
of market timing to the success of the PADC, is analyzed
relative to the timing of the plan implementation.
Unraveling the PADC's Unique Capital Structure
History has shown that some form of public assistance
is needed to redevelop in areas that are considered
marginal for private development activity. Public
development agencies (PDAs) have provided public assistance
28
in many forms, including cash subsidies, low-interest or
no-interest loans, below-market terms on ground leases, or
publicly provided improvements to the development parcel
and/or the immediate area. The PADC activities are no
different in this regard. The general lack of development
activity and existing developer apprehension in the
Pennsylvania Avenue area convinced the PADC that, to be
taken seriously, it would need to present developers with a
comprehensive plan that outlined planning goals and policy
objectives, and a financial plan for the entire 21-block
area. With nearly $300,000 (1972 dollars) provided by
congress as part of the enacting legislation, the PADC
staff developed the Pennsylvania Avenue Plan.1
Multiple Funding Sources
The original Pennsylvania Avenue Plan included a
financial program that identified several and distinct
funding sources available to the PADC -- appropriations
from the U.S. Congress for public development activities,
and PADC salaries, and expenses; a line of credit with the
U.S. Treasury for land acquisition and related costs; gifts
and donations; and revenues received from the sale or lease
of land owned by the PADC. This type of structure, with
which each type of resource targeted for specific kinds of
uses (See Figure 5), allowed the PADC to separate those
FIGURE 5
ORIGINAL PADC CAPITAL STRUCTURE
(as presented and approved by Congress in 1974)
Sources and Uses of Funds
Source Amount Uses
Public $130 million Public Improvements




Salaries & Budgeted on PADC Salaries




$200 million Land Acquisition
Land Holding Costs:





Gifts and Unspecified Sponsor events
Donations Residential Activities
Public Relations
Project Unspecified Repay U.S. Treasury Debt
Revenues Secure Bonds
Acquire addt'l property
Source: Pennsylvania Avenue Plan 1974
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costs and expenses that could be financed from those that
were strictly public improvement projects and overhead
expenses and, as such, nonfinanceable. The Pennsylvania
Avenue Plan was approved by Congress as submitted. When
the PADC began to implement the Plan in 1977 it had the
advantage of some unique financial tools with which to do
so.
A. Federal appropriations -- two types:
1. Salaries and Expense Fund. Covering operating
expenses, including salaries of PADC employees,
administrative expenses, and PADC's consultant
fees. These funds, budgeted and approved on an
annual basis, are based upon anticipated need
for the upcoming fiscal year. They do not have
to be repaid and are not capped at a maximum
amount. For fiscal year 1991, for example, the
PADC has requested $2.465 million for 28
employees and expected administrative expenses.
2. Public Development Fund. A one-time
$130-million capitalization for infrastructure
improvements, parks and open space development,
historic preservation, affirmative action
activities, tenant relocation assistance, and
other public sector costs was approved in whole
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as part of the 1974 Pennsylvania Avenue Plan.
These costs were viewed by the PADC as public
investments, and therefore would not be
financed with proceeds from the sale or lease
of PADC owned land. This appropriation was
approved on a "no-year" basis, which gives the
PADC to access these funds until the entire
project is complete. Annually, the PADC
identifies public improvement projects and
submits a Public Development request to
Congress as part its annual budget. The PADC
also expected to use these appropriations to
fund cash shortfalls on parcels where a change
in use (from commercial to residential)
precluded the PADC from recovering all its
acquisition costs through the disposition of
the land. However, the success of PADC's early
projects and the revenues generated by them has
eliminated the need for using appropriated
funds for that purpose.
B. Revolving line of credit: The PADC has the power to
borrow up to $200 million from the U.S.Treasury, to
assist prospective developers through land assembly
activities. These funds can be used to purchase
land; to fund a range of costs during the
and planning stages (appraisals,
surveys, closing costs, as well as insurance, legal
fees, taxes, property management services, and
utility expenses); and to finance demolition, site
preparation, interest charges, and other costs
associated with holding the property until
disposition. In establishing this line of credit
congress also required that all funds borrowed by
the PADC for the acquisition of land, including all
costs identified above, be repaid with interest to
the U.S. Treasury. Because it is a federally owned
corporation, the PADC is entitled to borrow money at
the U.S. Treasury borrowing rate. This rate
fluctuates on an annual basis, but has typically
been between 8% and 9%. Loans from the U.S.Treasury
that are outstanding after the project is completed
will be repaid through the sale of long-term (40
year) guaranteed bonds secured by existing PADC
ground-lease revenues.2
C. Gifts and Donations: All gifts given to the PADC or
donations made by individuals, institutions, or
corporations are used to sponsor events in PADC
parks, public relations, informational literature
about PADC and its projects, and residential
community activities.3
predevelopment
D. Project revenues: Revenues generated from the sale
or lease of PADC-owned land is first used for the
repayment any debt obligations to the U.S.
Treasury. Any revenues in excess of debt
obligations are used by the PADC to acquire
additional land or to subsidize residential
components of PADC-sponsored projects. Early
success on the Willard, National Place, and Market
Square projects has generated surplus revenue and
allowed the PADC to avoid using appropriated funds
for repayment of Treasury borrowing obligations
where write-downs were needed, due to land use
changes from commercial to residential. Upon
completion of the entire project in 1994, revenues
from ground leases will be used to secure the sale
of long-term guaranteed bonds. After U.S. Treasury
and bond debt service payments have been made,
surplus project revenues will be used for
maintenance and property management within the plan
area.4
The PADC 1989 Annual Report indicates that at the end
of fiscal year 1990, the PADC had used $134 million in
public development appropriations, $28.4 million in
salaries and expenses, and $100 million of its borrowing
authority. In the same time period the PADC had generated
$160 million in revenues through sales or leases of real
estate, which it has used to retire Treasury debt, acquire
additional parcels, and also assist in subsidizing the
residential components of the plan. Figure 6 shows how the
PADC has utilized these funding sources over the course of
its tenure. It is expected that by 1994 when the plan is
complete, PADC investment will have leveraged over
$1.7 billion worth of private development activity.5
Using the Capital Structure to Create Opportunities
With its capital structure the PADC has been given a
unique set of tools to implement the 1974 Plan. These
tools have provided the agency with guaranteed resources
and assurances that are not available to all PDAs.
The Salaries and Expense Fund makes the PADC somewhat
unique among PDAs, in that its salaries and consultants are
fully funded with appropriated monies. While it is true
that the PADC's annual budget requests are not always 100%
funded it does not have to rely on sources other than
congressional appropriations for paying for its overhead.
In contrast, most PDAs must rely heavily on revenues from
completed projects or city budget funds which are subject
to competing uses. Some agencies, like the Boston
Redevelopment Authority, now rely solely on project
revenues for salary and expense funding. Additionally, the
FIGURE 6
PADC FUNDING
Fiscal year 1977 - Fiscal Year 1990
($ in thousands)
Year Salary and Public U.S. Treasury
Expense Fund Development Borrowings
Fund
FY 73 Supp. $ 350 $ 0 $ 0
FY 74 350 0 0
FY 74 Supp. 150 0 0
FY 75 824 0 0
FY 76 824 0 0
FY 76 Supp. 218 0 0
FY 77 1,000 0 0
FY 77 Supp. 32 4,081 25,000
FY 78 1,294 12,354 7,500
FY 78 Supp. 29 0 0
FY 79 1,630 12,355 13,400
FY 79 Supp. 29 17,900 19,600
FY 80 1,856 20,110 17,000
FY 80 Supp. 50 500 0
FY 81 2,443 14,1 15,000
FY 82 2,246 13,632 2,400
FY 82 Supp. 48 0 0
FY 83 2,350 8,750 0
FY 84 2,275 9,600 0
FY 85 2,254 4,410 0
FY 86 2,215 3,091 0
FY 87 2,397 3,924 0
FY 88 2,516 3,000 0
FY 89 2,334 3,175 0
FY 90 2,375 3,150 100
TOTAL $28,373 $134,201 $100,000
Source:
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annual salary and expense fund provides the PADC with the
resources to continually reevaluate its plan, as has been
the case with numerous plan amendments and working papers
generated by the PADC staff.
The significant amount of funding committed to public
investments in open space and historic preservation was
another mechanism by which the PADC was able to attract
private developers. The large scale and contiguous nature
of the plan area provided the agency an advantage missing
in most other redevelopment zones and allowed the PADC to
concentrate its public development resources in a single
area. Money invested on a park brought immediate benefits
to all developers who invested along the Avenue. The
Pennsylvania Avenue Plan estimated the costs associated
with each parcel of land within the development area as
part of their initial funding request. If there was ever a
doubt by developers of the PADC's commitment to completing
this redevelopment project, $130 million of appropriated
funds dedicated for use in improving the development area,
was enough of a commitment to attract nationwide developer
interest.
The line of credit provides the PADC with a means of
assisting developers in a number of ways, in particular,
with the flexibility to modify deals to suit developers
needs. For example, being able to repay the Treasury
immediately out of project proceeds and revenues or later
through by the issuance of 40-year bonds allowed the PADC
to offer developers the choice of either purchasing sites
or establishing a long-term ground lease. In addition, the
PADC could also offer developers supplemental project
financing in the form of unsubordinated short-term
mortgages. The security inherent with funding by the U.S.
Treasury was another feature that gave credibility to PADC
projects. A primary obstacle faced by many private
developers was their inability to sustain the heavy costs
incurred during land assemblage and site preparation. The
PADC was able to use this line of credit to assist
developers in land assemblage on private development
ventures, as well as on its own projects.
Project revenues are another tool the PADC has used to
achieve its plan objectives. Since it could rely on the
salary and expense fund to cover its operating costs and
the public development fund for its capital expenditures,
the PADC used its anticipated project revenues solely to
repay Treasury debt or subsidize future projects and the
agency's nonfinancial policy objectives. The PADC's first
development competition, The Willard Hotel and Office
Building, which was set up as a ground lease, provides
annual revenues in excess of the PADC's U.S. Treasury
repayment obligations. Likewise, the Market Square site,
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sold to the developer at a $5 million profit, will provide
revenues allowing the PADC to cover shortfalls in those
projects where it had mandated the inclusion of less
profitable residential uses.6
Having a dedicated source of income like project
revenues will allow the PADC to issue the long-term bonds
needed to repay outstanding debts upon the completion of
the plan. Because these project revenues are not needed to
fund public development projects, or PADC salaries and
expenses, they can be leveraged to obtain the necessary
bond funds.
Learning from Early Projects
By virtue of its 15-year track record and the 110-acre plan
area, the PADC has been involved in more than two dozen
projects, and had much time over which to learn valuable
lessons. It has used the experiences of the first two
development competitions to adapt their approach to public
development to a changing market and to address
inadequacies of these initial competitions. Since the
first development competition in 1978 the PADC has changed
the way it negotiates with developers, modified the
development competition format and prospectus, and even
changed its land acquisition strategy. By reviewing the
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changes made by the PADC we can see how the public sector
has evolved as a developer, and how it has adapted to
changes in the market.
The First Competition
Built in the 1800s, the Willard Hotel had been
mothballed for nearly fifteen years before the PADC
acquired it in 1976. After partially restoring the
deteriorated hotel and preparing a development prospectus,
in 1978 the PADC invited developers to submit development
proposals for the restoration and redevelopment of the
Willard. In its first development competition the PADC
selected the developer on the basis of the design proposal,
and then negotiated the terms of a ground lease, the level
of restoration assistance, and the project schedule with
the successful bidder. Because the terms of the lease were
not identified in the prospectus and because the developer
had not yet committed funds to the project, negotiations
dragged on for nearly two years. When an agreement was
finally reached, the developer was unable to attain
financing and a second developer had to be brought on board
to complete the project. As a result, it was not until
1986, ten years after the PADC had acquired it, that the
Willard reopened.7
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Modifications to the Prospectus
The PADC learned many of its most valuable lessons from
this project. In the Willard competition it did not
prequalify developers on the basis of their financial
capability to build the project; it did not require deposit
monies to guarantee schedules; nor did it stipulate minimum
financial terms for the ground lease. Instead it chose to
leave them as negotiable items. This one-stage approach to
the selection process led to significant delays in
developer negotiations, project financing, and the search
for a new developer.8
Several changes were made as the PADC prepared for the
Market Square development competition 1982. The one-stage
development competition was replaced by a two-stage
competition which prequalified developers based upon their
financial capabilities and project experience. The
successful developer was required to submit deposits
totaling several thousand dollars, all of which would be
returned as the developer met key progress milestones --
including deal negotiation, site preparation, shell
completion, and occupancy. For the first time, the PADC
also included the minimum acceptable land-disposition terms
which were based upon market analysis and feasibility
studies performed by the PADC or its consultants. In the
development competition for the Landsburgh in 1986, the
PADC even went one step further by telling the developers
the discount rates to be applied when determining the
present value of their proposed ground lease terms. In all
development competitions since 1982, the PADC has required
developers invited to participate in the second stage of
the competition to complete a pro forma analysis of the
project cash flows as part of their development proposal.
So that the PADC could evaluate all proposals more readily,
developers were require to complete their pro formas on
standard forms provided by the PADC. The Landsburgh
prospectus even included a computer template to be used by
developers.9
Land Acquisition: PADC Response to a Changing Market
The way in which the PADC acquired land in this
110-acre redevelopment effort has had a significant impact
on the success of the overall project. As part of its
enabling legislation, PADC was granted the power to acquire
and dispose of land in its own name, in particular the
authority to use eminent domain as a means of land assembly
of land. With these powers the PADC was able to assemble
parcels of land that might otherwise have been too small or
too expensive to induce private developers seeking land
assemblages for new commercial development. The power to
acquire land, either through direct acquisition or eminent
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domain, was a tool by which the PADC could acquire land,
demolish existing structures, and prepare a site for
individual use or combine it with additional parcels for a
project of larger scope. This process would save the
private sector the high cost of private land assembly and
the risk of possible hold-outs, land owners who, in asking
high prices for the remaining parcel for a site, might
actually preclude the project from going ahead.
The approach that the PADC uses in land acquisition has
changed over the course of its 15-year history. The
initial strategy the agency used was to acquire the land
through a negotiated purchase or eminent domain taking and
hold it until its staff identified a development
opportunity. The concept was to acquire land early,
presumably at a lower cost, and absorb the project holding
costs until a the final project concept was specified and a
developer selected. It was thought that the appreciation
of the land between the time of acquisition and disposition
would exceed the costs incurred during the holding period.
Through this method of land acquisition, the PADC hoped to
capture the value created by their public investment in the
plan area and channel it into public initiative efforts,
such as residential development, affirmative action, or
historic preservation.
The PADC, however, underestimated the initial inflation
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of land prices that coincided with the announcement of
their intentions to redevelop Pennsylvania Avenue. This
unexpected land value inflation, in conjunction with
protracted negotiations with developers and delays in
project start up, meant that the PADC incurred holding
costs in excess of the land value appreciation. In the
case of the Willard Hotel, for example, eight years passed
between PADC acquisition of the site and the negotiation of
a ground lease with a developer. While the Willard was
still a financial success, it forced the PADC to rethink
its land acquisition strategy. In a 1983 internal memo, Al
Milin, PADC's Director of Finance, commented:
If we [the PADC] continue to acquire land and
hold it until a development opportunity is
identified, our holding period costs may
exceed our gains from appreciation. If this
scenario is borne out it raises the question
of where we will find the necessary funds to
repay monies borrowed from the U.S. Treasury
to acquire the land and the cosH incurred
while we decide what to do with it.
The alternative to the initial strategy was to defer
land acquisition until a specific development opportunity
was identified. With land prices increasing and
uncertainty about whether it could recoup the heavy
carrying costs incurred, the PADC changed its land
acquisition strategy to a method more widely used by public
redevelopment agencies. The PADC would wait to acquire
land until a development opportunity had been identified
and a preliminary development plan completed. In this way
the PADC could minimize the holding costs associated with
interest payments, maintenance and upkeep of existing
buildings, security, property management and other similar
carrying costs. Using its eminent domain powers, the PADC
was able to acquire land at the "current fair market
value." In the competitive Washington, D.C. market, the
PADC operated under the premise that developers were
prepared to pay fair market value for the land, plus the
cost of land assembly incurred by the PADC. This was a
reasonable assumption because the PADC's cost of land
assembly would be considerably less than that of a private
developer who faced the prospect of hold-outs and unknown
delays.
The new strategy also insured that a project would go
ahead when the market dictated its viability. Having used
this approach on Market Square, the Lansburgh, and other
PADC sponsored projects, the PADC has been very
successful. In Market Square, for example, the PADC sold
the site to the successful bidder for $26.1 million. When
the development prospectus was prepared in 1982, the PADC
called for a minimum purchase price of $25 million, which
covered PADC's projected total costs. Over the course of
the next three years it assembled and acquired the land
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necessary for the proposed project. Reduced holding costs
and a higher than minimum bid allowed the PADC to extract a
$5 million profit on the project.11 This more
conservative approach to land acquisition has worked well
for the PADC. By waiting until a project opportunity is
identified, holding costs were minimized because of the
shortened time period between acquisition and disposition.
Project Timing and the PADC Plan
While the careful planning and resources provided by
the PADC has contributed much to its overall success,
perhaps the single largest contribution was something out
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the lack of overall demand for space did little to change
this pattern.
During the period between the PADC's creation in 1972
and the implementation of the Pennsylvania Avenue Plan in
1976, the pattern of real estate development in Washington,
D.C. began to change. The implementation of the plan
coincided fortuitously with an increasing demand for space,
while vacant parcels suitable for development in the CBD
became harder to find. At the same time, the federal
government was finishing two office buildings in the
Pennsylvania Avenue area, and construction of METRO subway
lines through the plan area was already underway. Buoyed
by this improving real estate market, the PADC introduced
plans to oversee the development of nearly six million
square feet of new development over the course of the next
fifteen years. 12
As Al Milin pointed out:
All things considered, the timing of our plan
had about as much to do with our success as
any single planning feature. If we had tried
to implement the Pennsylvania Avenue Plan in
the late sixties instead of the late
seventies, it would never have worked. In
the sixties no one would have considered any
kind of commercial development east of 16th
street. As land in the old CBD became more
scarce and land prices rose, developers were
starting to look outside of the traditional
development areas. This coincided with the
release of the Pennsylvania Avenue Plan. The
PADC's announcement of its intentions to
rehabilitate Pennsylvania Avenue in
combination with the resources committed to
it gave the plan instant viability. The
PADC's announcement in 1978 that the Willard
Hotel was going to be part of a development
competition finally raised developers
eyebrows regarding the possi lity of new
development [in the plan area].
With the completion of the first design competition for
the rehabilitation and expansion of the Willard Hotel in
1978, the PADC sent a message to developers that
Pennsylvania Avenue was a valuable area for redevelopment
as well as for new development. Through a combination of
increased demand and the short supply of commercial grade
property, the announcement of PADC's plan in 1974 attracted
considerable attention. For example, the Willard
prospectus, issued in 1978, generated development proposals
from nine development teams; later in 1982, the Market
Square competition, which required developers to submit
$50,000 deposits as evidence of their commitment, produced
four development proposals. In general, all of the PADC
development competitions have generated a similarly high
level of interest.
The timing of the plan implementation was not entirely
a case of being in the right place at the right time. The
PADC was able to use their resources to conduct many
necessary market analyses and project feasibility studies
during the time period leading up to the plan
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implementation. Had the studies indicated a lack of demand
or an oversupply of space elsewhere within the city, the
PADC would have delayed implementation of that project.
The planning and financial stability surrounding the
PADC's plan, and its subsequent success with early project,
has allowed the PADC to foster and fuel a healthy
development climate over the course of its 15-year
history. The economic benefits of a development this size
have been numerous: increased real estate taxes, sales
taxes and income taxes; new jobs; and increased retail
activity. Success also has positioned the PADC to set and
achieve policy objectives, described in the next part of
this thesis, that provide public benefits beyond those
derived from new jobs and a higher tax base.
PART THREE
USING PRIVATE INVESTMENT TO OBTAIN PUBLIC BENEFITS
The PADC has used its success as a public developer to
attain several non-financial policy objectives. As it
prepared the Pennsylvania Avenue Plan in 1974, the PADC
targeted specific public benefits that might not be
provided through private development efforts. Its plan
called for the creation of a residential neighborhood
within an area that was zoned for commercial uses. By
infusing 1200-1500 housing units, the PADC hoped to
revitalize the area. The Plan also outlined an affirmative
action plan that sought to include minorities, women, the
handicapped, and veterans of the Vietnam era in all aspects
of PADC projects. In addition, the plan called for the
preservation and restoration of many Pennsylvania Avenue
historic landmarks.
This chapter uses examples provided by the Willard
Hotel, Market Square, and Lansburgh competitions to detail
the methods the PADC used to set, implement, and enforce
these policy objectives. By using projects that span the
fifteen years of PADC's activity, I will show how the
changing real estate market has positively influenced the
agency's ability to reach goals that were set in the early
seventies. In particular, these cases illustrate the
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effect of escalating land values on the PADC's residential
development plan, and how the agency used its portfolio of
projects to meet its residential development goal.
The Three Cases
The Willard Hotel and Office Building
In 1978 the PADC selected the Willard as its first
development competition. Built in the early 1800s the
Willard Hotel was originally a hostelry. When the
redevelopment effort was completed in 1986, the Willard had
been transformed from an old decaying hotel into a
completely restored 365-room hotel with 24,300 square feet
of retail space and 218,600 square feet of prime office
space.
By following federal historic landmark guidelines when
it prepared the general development program, the PADC
committed itself to a plan for restoring the Willard to its
original condition and use as a hotel. This decision was
in large part the result of an investigation into the
structural integrity of a building that had been vacant for
nearly fifteen years. The consultant's reports indicated
that the PADC needed to begin restoration immediately if it
wanted to save the hotel. The PADC felt the Willard's
proximity to the existing central business district (CBD)
and two-block walk to the White House would help attract
private interest to an area that had been void of
development activity for many years. The decision to
restore the hotel, versus demolishing it for a new office
building, forced the PADC to make cash subsidies to the
developer to offset the higher development costs associated
with building around and repairing the existing structure
while complying with federal historic restoration
guidelines. 1
Market Square
After the Willard competition and the protracted
negotiation period and search for a second developer, the
PADC revised its selection format to include a
prequalification stage that screened development teams
based on their prior development experience and financial
capabilities. The first project to use this format was
Market Square. When finished in 1990, Market Square will
consist of 585,500 square feet of office space,
104,100 square feet of retail space, 800 parking spaces,
and 210 units of housing.
The original development program outlined in the
prospectus called for 225 residential units to be
constructed as part of a larger mixed-use project. Other
program requirements called for the maximization of office
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and retail uses that compliment the residential character
of the area. In the course of negotiations with the
developer reduced the total housing units in the project
were reduced from 225 to 210. Later in Part 3 I will use
this negotiation to illustrate the PADC's ability to adjust
the development program, while maintaining their long-term
objectives. This project will be used to show how the PADC
has maintained a proactive role to meet affirmative action
objectives. While developers of previous PADC projects had
maintained the needed overall 75% compliance on affirmative
action guidelines, the developers were unable to meet the
10% equity participation guideline set by the PADC. During
the Market Square competition the PADC took steps to
correct these deficiencies.2
The Lansburgh
Built in 1882, "Lansburgh's" was a Washington,
D.C.-based department store that had operated at its
'E' Street location until a slump in the retail market
forced its closing in 1973. When this PADC sponsored
project is completed in 1991, the building will reopen as
369 residential units, 44,500 square feet of retail space,
a 30,600-square-foot community arts space, and 365 parking
spaces. The successful developer, selected primarily
because they were the only developer to submit a proposal
that was 100% residential, was the first developer to
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receive unanimous support from the PADC during the
selection process. The unanimous selection was a strong
indicator of the PADC's overall desire to create a
significant residential presence along the Avenue.
The original prospectus called for a mix of uses
consisting of a minimum of 225 residential units, retail,
community arts space, and an optional office component. To
the delight of the PADC, the developer proposed far in
excess of the minimum housing requirement and no office
space. As part of its prospectus, the PADC provided
financial incentives to developers, if their proposed
development program exceeded the number of housing units
specified by PADC. These financial incentives would be
funded by the proceeds from the Market Square project and
surplus lease revenues on other properties. The Lansburgh
site was also designated as a historic landmark and
consequently required additional financial assistance from
the PADC for the added costs incurred by the developer.3
Residential Development in a Commercial Zone
The most visible evidence of the PADC's ability to
pursue and attain policy objectives was the creation of a
new residential neighborhood within the eastern sector.
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called for the housing component to be concentrated between
7th and 9th Street and between E Street and Pennsylvania
Avenue. The Corporation recognized that the creation of
this residential neighborhood in an area with no existing
housing would require that the residential development and
its supporting uses function as a self-sufficient
community. Together with its housing consultant, the PADC
decided that the critical mass necessary to achieve this
result was between 1200 to 1500 units. The PADC felt that
a combination of rental and for-sale housing would best
suit the needs of the area.4
Downzoning for Residential Development
The area targeted by the PADC for this community was at
the time zoned for commercial uses. Residential
development in Washington, as in most cities with high
density development, has traditionally been less profitable
than commercial development. Since the Pennsylvania Avenue
Plan also called for an increase in the allowable
floor-area-ratio for commercial development in this area,
it created a situation where the PADC would purchase land
zoned for commercial development at a price commensurate
with the highest-and-best commercial use, then down zone it
to residential, and have to sell or lease the property at a
price to make residential development feasible. The PADC
could have sought a rezoning from commercial to residential
to drive down land values, but its staff and consultants
estimated that the legal expenses and the time lost in
disputes with current land owners would out weigh the costs
of the PADC absorbing the land cost differential. Because
the creation of a residential neighborhood was seen by the
PADC as an essential component of this plan, it set aside
$20 million of the $130 million appropriated for public
development activities to cover the cost difference between
the acquisition and disposition prices.5
Again, the timing of the plan, and the excitement and
attention generated by PADC's early successes, played a key
role in the implementation of the housing initiative. In
the prospectus for Market Square, the PADC set the minimum
land disposition price at $25 million, provided that the
developer include a minimum of 225 housing units. The
developer could choose to reduce the number of housing
units, but only at an additional cost of $80,000 per unit
for every unit less than 225. There was a limit, however.
The developer was not allowed to propose less than 100
housing units. Consequently, the disposition price varied
from $25 million (for a proposal with 225 units) to $35
million (for a proposal which included only 100).6
Through this pricing, the PADC recognized that the
developer would be trading cash for the opportunity to
develop more profitable commercial space, and that, in
doing so, it could use such funds to subsidize housing on
other sites.
To establish the disposition price and trade-off
allowance for the Market Square site, the PADC conducted
several market analyses of comparable commercial and
residential sites surrounding the plan area. Then it
applied the estimated pricing guidelines to its site and
established the different values for commercial and
residential uses. The PADC also added one additional
consideration to the pricing of the residential units.
Since the area that they wanted to develop into a
neighborhood had no existing housing, new housing would be
extremely risky, especially since the area was void of
commercial development as well. To explicitly define this
risk, the PADC included in its pro forma a longer than
usual lease-up and sales schedule, and lower rental and
sales values for the units in this previously
nonresidential area. The sites along Pennsylvania Avenue
were considered more valuable and were estimated to have
shorter lease-up periods than those parcels located off the
Avenue.7
When the D.C. real estate market took off in the early
eighties so did land values in the plan area. As a result,
the PADC acquired the land for Market Square at a time when
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land values were still rising. The appreciation during the
holding period between acquisition and disposition was
sufficient to allow the PADC to repay its Treasury
borrowings, including write-down costs associated with the
residential down-zoning, and still pull out approximately
$5 million in profit. It was through minimization of
holding costs and increased appreciation that the PADC
eliminated the need to rely on appropriated monies to fund
the residential objective.8
The $5-million upside of the Market Square project
allowed the PADC to push ahead with the next development
competition -- the Landsburgh, another project slated to
have a major housing component. Using the same analytical
strategy as employed in the Market Square project, the PADC
arrived at a disposition price for the property. The
success of the Market Square competition and the ever
increasing development activity along Pennsylvania Avenue
allowed the PADC to restructure the development program for
the Landsburgh project. Instead of charging developers
more money and allowing them to reduce the quantity of
housing units, the PADC specified the minimum number of
units -- 225 for the Lansburgh -- and provided an incentive
for developers who chose to build more housing units. The
land disposition price was set at $10 million, and with the
success of the Market Square competition, higher estimated
rental rates, and better locational attributes along the
Avenue, the PADC was able to reduce the credit to $52,500
for each unit provided over 225 units. The maximum rebate
was $8.4 million. This set of terms allowed developers to
propose a 100% residential scheme that had anywhere from
225 to 385 units. With the profits from the Market Square
project and surplus revenues from other development
activity, the PADC was once again able to repay its U.S.
Treasury borrowings and associated land acquisition costs
without using appropriated monies.9
Housing for the Rich?
Market Square and the Landsburgh represent more than
half of the 1000 housing units that will be built in the
entire plan area. When most of the residential units are
ready for occupancy in mid-1990, the PADC will have been
quite successful in establishing the critical mass
necessary to sustain a residential neighborhood in this
part of D.C.. However, the one area that the PADC has
fallen short of its initial objective is affordable
housing. When the Plan was first written the PADC targeted
250 of the anticipated 1200 units for low-income housing,
with the expectation that federal subsidies would
compensate developers on low-income units. 10  With the
elimination of Sections 235 and 236 subsidies of the
60
National Housing Act, these affordable units were
subsequently dropped from the PADC's program. The reasons
were many and justifiable. Commercial land costs in the
Pennsylvania Avenue area, where no housing currently
existed, were so high that the subsidies required to fund
one unit could provide assistance for many units in other
neighborhoods already zoned residential. Thus, Section 8
subsidies that were available for low-income residents of
Washington, D.C. were targeted by government officials for
other areas within the city. Because the PADC was
obligated to repay all U.S. Treasury borrowings used for
land acquisition, PADC staff reasoned that the agency could
not provide the substantial subsidies required to offset
the higher development costs. In addition, increased land
costs reduced the overall number of housing units from the
projected 1200-1500 units, down to 1000. This reduction in
the total number, attributable to the higher land prices,
also contributed to the elimination of the affordable
component. The end result was that housing along
Pennsylvania Avenue consists of 100% market rate units,
many of which are being used by corporations as "hotel
suites" for employees in town for business. This
consequence detracts from the PADC's goal of creating an
area of intense activity, because much of the housing will
be underutilized. Critics claim that these transient uses
will preclude the development of a true neighborhood
atmosphere and the activity generally associated with
one.1 1
Affirmative Action
Washington, D.C. has the highest minority population,
as a percentage of total city population, of any major
urban center in the United States. 12  As a result, the
PADC decided to insure minority participation in all
aspects of the redevelopment of Pennsylvania Avenue by
including significant minority business and worker
requirements in each development prospectus, as well as by
providing financial incentives to developers who met or
exceeded these minimum guidelines. This section looks at
how the PADC set the guidelines and the way in which it has
adapted its approach in response to unexpected shortcomings
in its initial guidelines.
Establishing the Guidelines
The PADC used the federal guidelines outlined in
regulation number 36 CFR 906.2 as a basis for its own
requirements, however, it chose to increase the minimum
acceptable percentages for all categories of affirmative
action hiring. The high percentage of minorities and the
prominent status of Washington, D.C. as the nation's
capitol figured prominently in the PADC's decision to raise
the performance criteria that developers had to meet on its
projects. The categories and participation guidelines were
designed to cover minorities, women, handicapped persons,
and Vietnam era veterans in all aspects of the real estate
development and targeted specific services in the following
ways:
1) Equity Participation -- 10% participation by
minorities, women, and/or minority owned businesses,
2) Contracts for Professional Services -- 20% of total
contracts value to minority-owned businesses,
3) Individuals Providing Professional Services -- 20%
should be provided by minorities, women, handicapped
persons, or Vietnam-era veterans,
4) Construction Contracting -- 15% of total
construction value to minority owned businesses,
5) Construction Employment -- 35% of construction hours
worked shall be by minorities, women, handicapped
persons, or Vietnam era veterans,
6) Purchasing -- 20% of total purchases are to be
provided by minority-owned businesses,
7) Hotel Employment -- 20% of all employees, 15% of all
employees earning more than $2,000 per month
(1978 dollars), and 60% of all hotel trainees shall
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be minorities, women, handicapped persons, or
Vietnam-era veterans; and
8) Leasing -- 15% of all retail space shall be leased
to minority-owned businesses.
As part of the development proposal submission,
developers were required to include an affirmative action
plan which documented how the development team planned to
meet these guidelines. This plan included the designation
of an affirmative action officer, progress tracking and
reporting plans, and any additional affirmative action
plans beyond those called for by the PADC. 1 3
Developer Incentives
The PADC staff recognized that by requiring developers
to meet affirmative-action requirements, it was asking
developers to provide something not required in a private
development venture. They also recognized that preparing
and implementing the affirmative-action plan would
represent a significant cost to the developer. In
recognition of these costs, the PADC planned to offer the
successful developer financial incentives to meet the
affirmative action guidelines specified in its development
prospectus. In most PADC development competitions the
developer was allowed to choose whether they would purchase
the land or lease it from the PADC, so the PADC developed
several incentive formats so that a developer could be
compensated, upon completion of the project. The PADC
established a 75% threshold as the minimum compliance
level. This meant that to receive the incentive, the
developer had to meet or exceed the minimum quota for at
least 75% of the eight minority-hiring guidelines specified
above. The developer was required to submit an
affirmative-action plan to the PADC for approval. In
addition, the developer was required to submit quarterly
reports indicating the compliance level for each of the
eight affirmative-action guidelines. If, after an
affirmative-action plan has been approved by the PADC, the
developer falls below the 75% level he forfeits any
incentive, until such time as he is able achieve compliance
levels. The PADC offered developers a choice of one of the
following incentives:
1) Reduced-Rate Mortgages. In general, the PADC would
offer developers unsubordinated short-term
mortgages, at 12.5%, as supplementary project
financing. If, however, the developer elected to
receive this form of supplemental financing and he
then complied with affirmative-action requirements,
the PADC would reduce the mortgage rate to 10% for
the duration of the loan, usually until construction
was completed. If the developer failed to maintain
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minimum quotas they would be forced to return the
funds, with additional interest (2.5%) from the date
that the rate was reduced.
2) Land-Purchase Credit. Should the developer elect to
purchase the site, the PADC would offer a cash
credit to the developer if he reached and maintained
the 75% compliance level with respect to the overall
affirmative-action requirements. In the Market
Square project, for example,the PADC offered to
deposit $500,000 dollars in an interest-bearing
account, payable to the developer upon successful
implementation of an affirmative-action plan,
payable upon project completion.
3. Rent Deferral. Should the developer elect to lease
the site, the PADC offered developers a rent
deferral during the construction period. The rent
deferral, set up to assist developers during the
early stages of projects when cash flows were
critical, was to be repaid by the developer with
interest upon construction completion. The interest
rate would be established at the same level that the
PADC paid on borrowings from the U.S. Treasury.14
The PADC staff established these incentives after
completing an in-house analysis to estimate developer costs
associated with the creation and implementation of an
affirmative-action plan. While all three incentives were
estimated to have the same present value, the PADC
recognized that the developers submitting proposals would
have different capital structures and would not necessarily
approach the project in the same fashion. Developers who
met the 75% overall compliance level and were able to
maintain it throughout the project, received the incentive
upon project completion. Those who fell below the 75%
level during the project, but were able to make adjustments
and finish the project at the 75% compliance level, were
still able to receive the incentive, which was adjusted
downward for the period that the developer was not in
compliance. Federally developed plans for other
affirmative-action programs were also used as a template
for PADC guidelines and cost estimates. 15
The Impact of Affirmative Action
The timing of the plan implementation and the
competitive Washington, D.C. real estate market figured
prominently in the success of the PADC's affirmative action
plan. With the first development competitions, the PADC
staff was unsure whether developers would be able to comply
or how much pressure the agency could apply, outside of the
incentives, to achieve its policy objective. The
prospectus for the PADC's first two competitions stated
that preference would be given to those developers who
included with their development proposal an
affirmative-action plan. With these incentives the PADC
had no trouble generating proposals that included
affirmative-action plans. After the successful completion
of the Willard and another 1978 competition, National
Place, both of which included affirmative-action plans, the
redevelopment area was attracting much attention, from both
public and private investors. As a result, although
Market Square, the Lansburgh, and the PADC's five
subsequent development competitions offered similar
financial incentives, the development prospectus made it
clear that only developers who included affirmative-action
plans in their proposal would be considered.
Buoyed by the success of the Washington real estate
market and the knowledge that it could require an
affirmative-action plan from all developers, the PADC
continued to seek greater minority participation in those
categories that were falling short of their targets. While
all developers were able to meet the overall 75%
requirement, none had met the 10% equity participation by
minorities, women and/or minority-owned businesses. The
PADC surveyed developers and local minority leaders in an
attempt to find out why this target was not being met. The
results of the survey indicated that developers were unable
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to find interested minority equity partners; minority
leaders suggested that developers did not know how to
establish connections with eligible investors. Instead of
reducing the minimum requirement so that developers were
able to meet the goal, the PADC staff, assisted by minority
organizations, established a list of eligible and
interested minority businesses and individuals and made it
available to developers as part of the development
prospectus. With additional input, developers of the most
recent PADC development competition, Pennsylvania Plaza,
were able to meet the 10% minority equity participation
requirement.16
Historic Preservation
"At the heart of the Corporation's work to
revise the Avenue and its environs is a deep
concern for the tradition of urban design and
architecture that have shaped the City of
Washington. "17
1983 PADC Annual Report
Since its inception in 1790, Washington D.C. has been
the most prominent symbol of American history. When it was
designed by Charles L'Enfant in 1791, the focal point of
the city was the triangle formed by the White House, the
Capitol, and the Washington Monument. Although not by
design, Pennsylvania Avenue soon developed into the main
commercial and business street of the city. During the
19th century many of the structures built on Pennsylvania
Avenue were of French chateaux, Gothic and Romanesque
architectural styles. The Avenue's pattern of grand design
continued into the early 20th century as the United States
became a world power and it continued with the construction
of many federal buildings, in the area that is now called
the Federal Triangle.
Recognizing the importance of the Avenue, the PADC
designed a historic preservation strategy, which it laid
out in the 1974 Pennsylvania Avenue and the 1977 Historic
Preservation Plans prepared by the PADC staff. The
strategy called for the retention and restoration of all
National Register Landmark buildings and the creation of a
historic district within the plan area.'8  During the
preparation of the capital budget PADC staff analyzed all
historic buildings within the plan and prepared estimates
for expected restoration costs. Due to its flexible and
abundant sources of funding, the PADC was able to budget
approximately $11.1 million of the Public Development Fund,
to assist private developers in the preservation and
restoration of these public landmarks. This it has done in
two ways -- by providing financial assistance to private
developers as an incentive to rehabilitate existing
structures and by acquiring historic structures that might
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otherwise have deteriorated beyond repair.19
In the case of the Willard Hotel the PADC's reports
indicated that immediate action was required if the hotel
was to be saved. After acquiring the hotel the PADC
invested the necessary funds to shore up the structure and
make it weathertight. It then held the first PADC
sponsored development competition, during which the PADC
specified that the hotel was to be saved and restored to
its original condition. When the PADC wrote the
development prospectus for the Willard it chose not to
include a disposition price for the parcel, due to the
unknown extent of restoration required and the total cost
of such an effort. As the project was designed, and later
built, the PADC worked with the developer, providing
financial assistance for those restoration costs not
covered by the Federal Historic Preservation funds.2 0
The PADC has also used public development
appropriations to plan historic restoration projects years
in advance. On eight PADC projects, including Market
Square and the Landsburgh, the PADC has paid for the
removal and storage of facades, lobbies, and other
irreplaceable parts of buildings until such time as they
can be incorporated into specific development projects. In
the case of Market Square, these facades could not be used,
however the PADC included in a subsequent prospectus a
requirement for the reuse of the existing facades into any
design proposed by the developer. In subsequent
negotiations with the successful developer, the PADC
provided additional assistance for the restoration and
installation costs associated with reusing these
facades.21
Whether it was the rebuilding of internal structures,
restoration of facades and slate roofs, or the dismantling
and storage of existing buildings, the subsidies available
through the nationally sponsored historic preservation fund
programs were insufficient to cover the tremendous expense
incurred. To date, the PADC has used over $8 million to
assist developers, including $5 million for the restoration
of the Willard and $500,000 for the Landsburgh
restoration. The PADC staff believes that the amount of
financial assistance it has provided has been more than
offset by the private sector dollars invested to save
non-PADC projects along the Avenue.
PART FOUR
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
As we move into the nineties we are a nation faced with
an oversupply of office space, a nationwide movement of
belt tightening, and corporate consolidation. Efforts by
the government to reduce the federal budget deficit will
further restrict the few remaining federal subsidies
available for development and housing assistance. As state
governments face budget crises, they will be forced to look
increasingly to the private sector for assistance. Now,
more than ever, public/private partnerships will move to
the forefront as a strategy for revitalizing our aging
cities. That is why it is essential that public
development agencies begin to study public/private
partnerships that have worked.
By analyzing the PADC one immediately recognizes that
they have had unique advantages not available to most
public development agencies. Less obvious are those
characteristics of the PADC's activities that can be
adapted for use by agencies in other cities. In general,
all cities, be they large or small, should be able to take
away an understanding of how the PADC planned the
redevelopment effort, and how, through the successful
implementation of the plan, it has been able to provide
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benefits to the city and its people. This chapter looks to
identify the key aspects of the public/private partnerships
used to redevelop Pennsylvania Avenue, and how they can be
applied to a more generic public/private partnership
model. It will address those areas where the PADC
initiative has missed the mark, such as affordable housing,
and how it could have been avoided.
Planning the Capital Structure
The one characteristic of the PADC that makes it stand
out as unique among public development agencies is the
capitalization provided by the government. While the
resources that the PADC was provided with are beyond the
means of most cities, the financial program established by
the PADC is not. The PADC prepared a development plan that
projected all costs, project and administrative, necessary
to implement and complete the plan. Through the separation
of its funding sources and their corresponding uses, the
PADC was able to accurately prepare a methodology for
repayment of debt incurred by the Corporation through its
development activities. Furthermore, it recognized the
need to budget public improvements, in their entirety, up
front, while budgeting for salaries and expenses on
as-needed basis. Additionally, the PADC was able to use
100% of revenues generated by its land to secure the bond
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issues needed for the repayment of its debt.
Most cities use funds gained through the disposition or
leasing of land to pay for salaries, public improvement
projects, and related expenses, but because PADC overhead
expenses were separated from all other costs, the PADC was
able to estimate project costs for the entire plan
redevelopment. By segregating these costs, the PADC
experience demonstrates, how redevelopment efforts can be
financed. PDAs that have access to more limited
appropriations could use appropriated funds for staff
salaries while relying on financing instrument such as tax
increment bonds to finance public development initiatives.
Thus, preserving project revenues, and proceeds from sales
for other goals like residential development, or historic
preservation.
Policy Objectives and Public Commitment
The obvious conclusion that can be reached by studying
the PADC's approach to affirmative-action objectives is
that establishing guidelines is not enough to ensure their
success. When the PADC set its affirmative-action
guidelines it did so with a dual purpose. With a high
percentage of minorities as residents of the District, the
PADC felt that increasing the normally recommended
guidelines was an important and visible example to set.
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Secondly, the PADC actively particpated in the assistance
of plan implementation on a project-by-project basis. It
was through this active participation that the PADC was
able to recognize that developers were unable to achieve
10% equity participation by minority investors. Rather
than decrease the level of participation, the PADC actively
sought out candidates that could be presented to private
developers as interested and qualified investors. This
constant interaction is primary reason that the PADC has
been able to increase participation above federal
guidelines, and successfully achieve 100% compliance with
the guidelines established by the PADC. It was because of
this determination and commitment to involve minorities and
residents in all aspects of projects that the PADC has not
only succeeded, but managed to find a way to get minorities
involved as equity partners and owners along the Avenue.
Changing the Use: Commercial to Residential
Changing the land use from commercial to residential,
in the eastern sector of the plan area to accommodate the
PADC's desire to integrate a residential component into the
plan raised many challenging issues. Among them was how to
establish the value of the land at its new use. The PADC
could have down zoned the area and then taken the land
through eminent domain proceedings, but faced with the
prospect of resistance, legal expenses, and extended
delays, they chose another route. Instead, the PADC chose
to acquire the land at fair market, change its use, then
sell or lease the land to developers at the fair market
value for the combination of commercial and residential
uses desired by the PADC. The PADC estimated sales costs
for residential land, then it offered the land at prices
commensurate with the less profitable residential use.
While the PADC was forced to finance a portion of the
residential development through other project revenues, it
provided the means to induce developers to provide the uses
desired by the PADC.
A related issue was the way in which the PADC actually
structured the incentive. It chose to set the disposition
price of the land based on its commercial value, plus the
value of the minimal amount of acceptable housing. The
PADC then offered a rebate on each additional unit of
housing above the minimum that the developer provided. The
developer would pay the full purchase price at the closing,
and the PADC would return the incentive after the project
was complete. This served the dual purpose of insuring
that the proposed scheme is actually built, and also
allowed the PADC to use the developer's funds for the
duration of the project.
How Successful was it?
The residential development of nearly 1000 housing
units in an area previously void of residential activity is
viewed as a great success by the PADC. It is felt by some
that without the residential development the overall plan
might not have been such a success. It is true, that when
completed, the residential neighborhood will bring much
activity to the plan area, but the market rate housing
created is priced such that most Washington residents
cannot afford to live there. Designed to bring
around-the-clock activity to the area, high prices, and the
proximity to government and business activities have led to
corporations purchasing units for use as corporate
apartments which are not occupied by permanent residents.
As stated in Part One, it was intended that 20% of the
units be provided as affordable housing units. The PADC,
however, incorrectly assumed that federal subsidies would
be available to fill the gap created between tenants
ability to pay and developer costs. More thorough research
by the PADC would have shown that the federal subsidies
that were available were not sufficient to fill the gap
created by the high price of new housing. The high land
costs associated with the new residential development made
it impossible to develop affordable units. Instead,
Section 8 subsidies went to existing neighborhoods that
were already residential and to areas where land costs were
priced such that normal subsidies were sufficient to fill
the gap. Developers, who were already paying land costs
that were prorated for both commercial and residential
uses, could not be expected to fund this gap, either
through proceeds from market rate units or from office
rents. In preparing its redevelopment plan the PADC
recognized that the creation of a residential neighborhood
would involve downzoning and the need for the PADC to fund
this land use change. It should have gone a step further
and recognized the need to make provisions in the plan to
partially subsidize the affordable units. Either the PADC
should have recognized the need to augment federal
subsidies through the use of appropriated funds, or perhaps
it should have considered allowing higher residential
densities to developers who provided, at their own cost,
affordable housing units. This is one of the few instances
where the PADC set a goal -- 250 affordable units, and
failed to properly analyze the feasibility of their
assumption and provide the resources needed to meet their
objective.
While I agree that the overall development of a housing
component is important, it seems that in this time of a
national housing crisis, the half-hearted attempt to follow
through on the PADC's initial affordable housing objective
79
has fallen far short. I think that there were
opportunities for the PADC to make some mid-course
corrections that would have provided the funds necessary to
fill the subsidy gap. When the PADC recognized that
appropriations would not be needed to fund the land use
change from commercial to residential, it could have
redirected these funds to assist with the realization of
the affordable housing component. Also, it could have
utilized profits from earlier projects and surplus lease
revenue to fill the gap or to offset below-market ground
leases.
"The D.C. Market"
Perhaps the single largest conclusion to be drawn from
this analysis is that without a cooperative real estate
market it is highly unlikely that the Pennsylvania Avenue
redevelopment effort would have succeeded to the degree it
has. The Washington, D.C. real estate market has been in a
boom mode for the last ten years. All seven PADC sponsored
projects as well as the 17 related private development
ventures along Pennsylvania Avenue have been initialized
during this ten-year span. While it is impossible to
quantify the impact of the general market conditions on the
successful implementation of the plan, it is reasonable to
suggest that the PADC might not have achieved some of its
goals had market conditions been less favorable. The
PADC's success on early projects allowed them to mandate
the inclusion of affirmative-action plans. A lack of
demand most certainly would have given them much less
bargaining power in their negotiations, and less surplus
revenues, thereby leading to different results. Likewise,
if more land had been available in the traditional
commercial area, the PADC would not have been able to price
their parcels as they did.
Summary
The PADC has accomplished much in 15 years as a public
developer. In critiquing the PADC it is important to
review its accomplishments in light of goals and objectives
set in 1974 when the original Pennsylvania Avenue Plan was
prepared. With the exception of affordable housing the
PADC has succeeded to a large degree in meeting the goals
it had set for itself. While it was uniquely capitalized,
the PADC demonstrated a financial planning process that,
subject to dramatic changes in the D.C. real estate market,
allowed them to commit resources to specific uses, thus
allowing them to do the long-range planning necessary for a
project of this scope and duration. The successful
implementation of the PADC's policy objectives can be
attributed not only to good timing but to careful planning
and relentless follow up. Continuous monitoring and
effective mid-process modifications ensured the
preservation of historic structures, participation of
minorities and city residents, and the creation of a new
neighborhood to support extensive commercial development.
The overall success of the PADC is evidence to support the
up-front planning and commitment of capital that is needed
for successful public development.
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